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ISSUE 2M ARCH/APRIL 1998
s HE ASIAN CRISIS began in the summer of 1997 with the dra-
matic devaluation of the Thai baht, but serious turbulence did
not begin to shake U.S. financial markets until last fall. What
was first seen as an isolated correction in an exotic East Asian
currency is now being viewed as a potential catalyst to global
financial meltdown. Is it now time to batten down the
hatches and hope we don’t get smashed in the Asian turbulence, or
is the recent tumultuous period just a mild swell on otherwise calm
waters?
At the present time, the impact of the Asian crisis on the United
States appears to be more of a swell than a tsunami. The direct 
effect on the national and U.S. regional economies will likely be
modest but not trivial, with some industries feeling it more than 
others. The indirect impact from increased financial market uncer-
tainty and spillovers to other emerging markets and Japan, however,
has the potential to be much larger. Unfortunately, these indirect 







sCharacteristics of the Asian Crisis
Three elements characterize the eco-
nomic and financial crisis in Asia. First,
as Chart 1 illustrates, there have been
large currency devaluations. Since the
Thai baht devalued on July 2, 1997,
most of the frontline Asian currencies
have lost nearly half their value. At one
point, the Indonesian rupiah traded at
one-fifth its predevaluation price. Sec-
ond, there has been substantial asset
deflation. Asian stock markets have
fallen by a third (Chart 2), and property
values have plummeted. Finally, bank
liquidity problems have contributed to a
continuing credit crunch. Some export
firms that would otherwise benefit from
the devaluation of the local currency
can’t get letters of credit to buy raw 
materials.
1
If some of Asia’s problems seem
reminiscent of the Texas banking crisis
of the 1980s, they should. Both crises
can be traced in part to risky ventures,
government guarantees and a lack of
adequate supervision and regulation.
2
Overall, the economic turmoil in East
Asia is serious, and the outlook for the
next six months remains uncertain.
Most estimates for the Asian crisis coun-
tries predict flat to slightly negative
growth in real GDP for 1998, a particu-
larly dramatic slowdown when com-
pared with the over 7 percent average
annual growth recorded for most of
these countries between 1990 and 1997.
Recent signals indicate Asian markets
may be regaining some calm, however.
Since mid-January several of the curren-
cies have begun to show signs of stabil-
ity as debt and austerity agreements
have been negotiated with the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and international
banks. Most Asian equity markets have
also shown improvement since the be-
ginning of the year. Despite these posi-
tives, we do not expect smooth sailing
in 1998. Asia’s markets are likely to 
see further turbulence interspersed with 
periods of calm as some banks are de-
clared insolvent and some firms fail.
U.S. Markets Tied to Asia
If the United States were completely
isolated from the rest of the world, Asia’s
crisis would not affect this country. How-
ever, the United States trades heavily
with Asia and benefits greatly from
being able to export to and import 
from the region. Americans also benefit
from lending money to the region at
higher rates than they receive at home.
Of course, these ties also mean that, at
least to some degree, we’re all in the
same boat. Turbulence on one side of
the Pacific will affect the other side.
Table 1 shows the United States’ top
five manufacturing exports and imports
as a share of total trade with the Asian
crisis countries. These are the U.S. in-
dustries most likely to be affected by
the recent Asian turmoil. As the table
shows, electrical goods and machinery
dominate both exports and imports
with these Asian countries. In addition,
our imports from Asia are dominated by
apparel, rubber products and vehicles,
while our exports to Asia are weighted
heavily toward the aerospace industry,
optical equipment and chemicals.
As Chart 3 shows, overall U.S. trade
with the Asian crisis countries has
grown since the mid-1980s, rising from
around 5 percent of total U.S. trade in
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Chart 1
Currency Devaluations
































Indonesia1986 to roughly 8 percent in 1997.
However, the U.S. share of trade with
these countries has declined slightly
from its 1995 peak.
One explanation for this decline is
increased trade with Latin America, par-
ticularly Mexico, since 1995. As shown
in Chart 4, Latin America’s share of our
imports grew substantially beginning in
1995, while trade with the Asian crisis
countries declined. Greater openness in
Latin America and Mexico’s peso de-
valuation are likely factors in this shift
in trade shares and may have con-
tributed to Asia’s recent troubles.
Direct investment in Asian crisis
countries has also increased dramati-
cally since the mid-1980s (Chart 5 ).
U.S. direct investment in the region
(which includes primarily U.S. invest-
ments in Asian plants and equipment)
grew from less than $500 million in
1986 to $4.1 billion in 1996—an eight-
fold increase.
Effects of the Asian Crisis
on the U.S. Economy
Because trade and capital flows are
the economic points of contact between
the United States and Asia, they will
also be the channels through which the
Asian crisis influences the United States.
There are both positive and negative 
aspects to this influence, and the effects
of the Asian crisis are not likely to be
the same across time.
Positives and Negatives of the Asian Crisis
On the positive side, the lower value
of Asian currencies causes import prices
to fall, benefiting not only consumers
but also manufacturers that use im-
ported Asian products in their produc-
tion processes. Lower import prices also
can reduce inflation in the near term.
Another positive from the Asian crisis
is lower interest rates. The Asian crisis
may reduce U.S. interest rates by in-
creasing capital flows into the United
States, which is often considered a safe
haven for international capital. The
Asian crisis may also lower nominal
U.S. interest rates by reducing both
global demand for credit and the out-
look for U.S. inflation. Lower interest
rates benefit borrowers in general and
the construction industry in particular.
Finally, corporate profits can rise in
those sectors, such as retailing and con-
struction, that benefit from cheaper 
imported products and lower interest
rates. Higher corporate profits can have
positive wealth effects for those who
hold stocks in these sectors. Employ-
ment in these sectors can rise as well.
The Asian crisis also poses a number
of negatives for the United States.
Cheaper imports make it difficult for
sectors, such as apparel manufacturers,
that compete with imported Asian goods.
So far, this effect has been muted be-
cause of financing problems in Asia and
the difficulty some exporters are having
in purchasing raw materials.
In addition, the crisis is likely to re-
duce Asian demand for U.S. exports.
For example, Korea reported that its de-
mand for foreign goods fell 40 percent
in January from year-earlier levels. Lower
U.S. interest rates can also adversely 
affect savers. Finally, corporate profits
will fall in those sectors that suffer from
reduced export demand, greater import
competition and market uncertainty.
This can depress stock prices, reduce
wealth and lead to employment losses.
Initial Effects of the Asian Crisis:
What Have We Seen So Far?
Financial markets are able to re-
spond more rapidly than goods markets
to an economic disruption. Thus, the
initial impact of the Asian crisis on the
United States has mainly come from the
effects of capital flows on stock prices
and interest rates.
After rising on a strong upward trend
in the three prior years, U.S. stock
prices generally traded in a flat range
from early October 1997 through much
of January 1998. This flattening suggests
that the Asian crisis is removing a
source of economic stimulus rather than
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ready induced a decline in interest rates,
such as the 30-year Treasury yield (Chart
6 ). These declines have boosted some
sectors, especially mortgage markets,
where refinancing activity and applica-
tions to buy homes recently set new
records (see Chart 6). Because rising
mortgage applications indicate a further
rise in overall home sales,
4 the Asian 
crisis has already stimulated construc-
tion and benefited homebuilders like
Centex Corporation, whose stock price
has recently outperformed the S&P 500
by rising roughly 30 percent between
early October and early March.
On the other hand, the negative 
effects of the Asian crisis on traded
goods industries may be evident in 
durable goods orders, a leading indica-
tor of investment spending (Chart 7 ).
After surging in November, durable
goods orders plunged in December 
and then edged up in January. Cutting
through the November spike, durable
goods orders appear to have flattened
out since September.
More timely data from the January
and February surveys conducted by 
the National Association of Purchasing
Management imply an even bigger Asian
effect in the future.
5 As shown in Chart
8, an index of import orders has firmed
slightly since October, but export orders
have plunged. Together, these indexes
imply that the U.S. trade deficit will
widen substantially in early 1998. In 
addition, the Asian crisis is apparently
reducing the backlog of U.S. orders. For
example, Boeing has seen cancellations
of some prior airplane orders.
What Are We Likely to See in 1998?
Overall, the Asian crisis will likely
put downward pressure on U.S. infla-
tion and economic growth in 1998. Most
private-sector economists assume that
the crisis will not mushroom into a
worldwide financial meltdown and esti-
mate that the Asian fallout will lower
U.S. GDP growth by one-half to one
percentage point in 1998.
Inflation Effects. How much down-
ward pressure the Asian crisis will put
on U.S. inflation remains uncertain. The
strengthening of the dollar against East
Asian currencies could, by some esti-
mates, cut Consumer Price Index in-
flation by one-quarter to one-half of a
percentage point this year. Along with
other factors, the crisis has also put
downward pressure on oil prices. To-
gether, these effects will lower inflation,
particularly in the first half of 1998,
which will help counteract price pres-
sures arising from tight labor and real
estate markets.
Note, however, that energy and im-
port price declines prior to the Asian
crisis had already cut U.S. inflation last
year. Thus, much of Asia’s effect on 
inflation will merely sustain prior down-
ward price pressure from foreign and
energy sources.
Output Effects. Most analysts are
expecting a negative overall effect of
the Asian crisis on U.S. GDP growth.
Net exports will likely fall hard in the
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imparting an outright negative effect.
Nevertheless, the less rosy outlook for
profit growth is apparently inducing
some U.S. firms to announce a new 
series of restructurings designed to 
bolster their bottom lines. Indeed, 
announced layoffs in December 1997
were 56 percent higher than those 
in December 1996, even though an-
nouncements through the first 11
months of 1997 were nearly 15 percent
below those posted through the first 
11 months of 1996.
3
On a brighter note, for reasons men-
Chart 6
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Chart 7
Durable Goods Orders 









1998 1997 1996 1995
Chart 8
Purchasing Managers 
Survey Shows Real Signs 










SOURCE: Based on data from National Association of
Purchasing Management.first half of 1998, as slower Asian
growth and the stronger dollar shrink
exports and boost imports. Neverthe-
less, the magnitude of the negative 
effect is uncertain. For example, there
are sizable differences between two
scenarios in which the Asian crisis has
conventional effects (Chart 9).
The first scenario is based on the
average forecasts from the January Blue
Chip Survey of economists. According
to this scenario, U.S. net exports will
deteriorate from a deficit of $146 billion
to nearly $190 billion (1992 dollars),
while GDP growth decelerates to an an-
nual average of 2.5 percent.
The second scenario, that of Chase
Securities, is the most pessimistic of 
the January Blue Chip Survey re-
sponses. According to this scenario, real
net exports fall to an annual average
deficit of $221 billion. The larger esti-
mated deficit reflects, among other
things, larger assumed impacts of the
Asian crisis on Japanese and Asian eco-
nomic growth and larger assumed im-
pacts of higher interest rates on Latin
American economies.
In addition to the wide range of the
conventional scenarios, several other
factors compound uncertainty about the
impact of the Asian crisis. First, neither
of the scenarios presented assumes the
Asian crisis will cause a financial crisis
in Japan, Latin America or Eastern 
Europe—events that would magnify
the effects already in train. Second, the
restructuring of the Asian economies
away from a model of export-led
growth to a more market-driven system
may be more drawn out and pro-
nounced than was initially believed.
Finally, previous experiences with cur-
rency crises—most notably the Mexi-
can peso crisis of 1994—provide only
limited guidance in understanding the
current crisis. U.S. net exports to Mex-
ico hit bottom two quarters after the
peso devaluation. It may take longer
than that for U.S. net exports to bottom
out this time because the Asian crisis
differs from the peso crisis in some key
respects. For example, the rescue plan
was drawn up more promptly in the
case of Mexico, and Mexico more readily
adopted reforms—especially compared
with Indonesia.
Effects of the Asian Crisis
on the Texas Economy
Because the Asian crisis will have
positive effects on some industries and
negative effects on others, it will likely
have an uneven effect across the re-
gions of the United States. Fortunately,
Texas is in a good position to weather
the storm.
The Texas economy has been ex-
panding briskly (Chart 10). In 1997,
employment growth exceeded the 
national average for the ninth consecu-
tive year. Total nonfarm employment
increased 4.2 percent, with strong in-
creases in all major industry groups.
The outlook calls for continued
healthy growth in Texas for a variety of
reasons. While the Asian crisis has
widened the range of economic fore-
casts, most forecasters expect only
moderate slowing in the U.S. and Mex-
ican economies in 1998. The construc-
tion industry should get a boost from
low vacancy rates and recent tax law
changes that favor housing invest-
ments.
6 The recent expansion of home
equity lending in Texas should generate
a one-time economic boost in 1998 as
homeowners gain better access to their
largest asset.
However, because some industries
are more exposed to the Asian crisis
than others, the crisis is likely to have a
meaningful effect on the composition of
the Texas economy. As was the case for
the U.S. economy, the Asian crisis will
affect Texas industries through its influ-
ence on interest rates and international
trade flows.
Table 2 presents some of the interest-
sensitive industries in Texas that are
particularly likely to benefit from lower
interest rates in the wake of the Asian
crisis.
7 If historical patterns are any
guide, the construction industry is 
likely to gain employment almost 
immediately, while employment gains
in other highly sensitive industries are
unlikely to appear until late 1998 or
even 1999.
The trade effects will be more mixed.
Not surprisingly, retailers and other im-
porters should gain, while import-
competing industries and exporters
should lose. Because they represent a
large share of our exports to Asia, agri-
culture and chemicals manufacturing
are particularly likely to lose sales in the
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Semiconductors –wake of the Asian crisis. Cattle hides
bound for South Korea are already
stacking up on the West Coast, and
prices paid to producers are down
$2–$3 per hide as a result of canceled
orders.
One by-product of the Asian crisis is
the sharply falling price of semiconduc-
tors. While it would be inappropriate to
attribute all the recent price declines to
the devaluations and the subsequent
drop in Asian demand and increase in
Asian supply, these effects undoubtedly
depress chip prices (Chart 11). The net
effect of the Asian crisis on the Texas
high-tech industry is difficult to deter-
mine, however, because lower chip
prices benefit Texas computer manu-
facturers (such as Compaq and Dell),
while they hurt Texas manufacturers of
semiconductors and semiconductor
equipment (such as Texas Instruments,
Motorola and Applied Materials). The
overall effect is likely to be close to a
wash.
An important factor in determining
the net trade effects of the Asian crisis
will be its impact on Texas trade with
Mexico. As the pie in Chart 12 illus-
trates, Texas exports considerably more
to Mexico than it does to Asia. Despite
this difference in relative size, however,
Mexico and Asia (broadly defined) have
historically acted like substitute markets
for Texas products. For example, a tem-
porary surge in exports to Asia nearly
offset the drop in exports to Mexico 
following the peso crisis. Such a pattern
is not surprising since, to a large extent,
the industries that dominate Texas ex-
ports to Asia—electronics, nonelectrical
machinery and chemicals—also domi-
nate Texas exports to Mexico. If history
repeats itself, then an increase in ex-
ports to Mexico could dampen the im-
pact of the Asian crisis for Texas
exporters.
On net, the impact on Texas of the
Asian crisis will probably depend on its
effect on oil prices, because lower oil
prices hurt not only the Texas economy
but also the Mexican economy. Energy
economist Stephen Brown of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Dallas estimates
that the Asian crisis can account for 
approximately one-quarter of the recent
decline in the price of oil (Chart 13). As
such, the crisis only slightly dampens
the forecast for Texas.
Conclusion
Asia has suffered a significant eco-
nomic crisis, but its financial markets
are beginning to stabilize. Unless the 
recent calm is merely the eye of the
storm, the Asian crisis should have only
a modest impact on the U.S. economy.
It is likely that the crisis will moderately
slow U.S. output growth and temporar-
ily reduce U.S. inflation. In Texas, the
net effects of the crisis will arise pri-
marily from its impact on oil prices.
— John V. Duca
David M. Gould
Lori L. Taylor
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Chart 12
Asia and Mexico as Substitute Markets for Texas Goods
(Real Texas Exports)
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(Notes are found on page 8.)
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.Further Information 
on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed  Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
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SWE SWE SWE Regional Update Regional Update
HE TEXAS ECONOMY continues to expand, but at 
a slower pace. Employment grew at a 2 percent 
annualized rate in January 1998, down from a 4.2 per-
cent rate in 1997. January’s growth was led by a 4.2
percent annualized growth rate in goods-producing
industries. Service-producing industries, though, only
managed a 1.4 percent annualized growth rate, with severe
contractions in business and personnel services and slow
growth in government. Retail trade and the finance, insurance
and real estate sector showed continued strength with better
than 6 percent employment growth in January.
Construction contract values softened but remain high,
with January showing $960 million of residential and $635
million of nonresidential construction in Texas. Construction
employment swelled at a 14.6 percent annualized rate. Energy
T
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI** Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
1/98 123.9 128.5 168.4 468.8 1,092.0 1,494.7 5,532.7 8,756.6 1,858.4 714.2
12/97 123.6 128.4 166.8 463.5 1,093.0 1,494.1 5,524.9 8,742.3 1,856.7 712.4
11/97 123.9 128.3 166.7 461.4 1,090.1 1,491.8 5,506.9 8,716.9 1,853.9 712.1
10/97 124.5 128.8 166.8 458.1 1,087.1 1,488.4 5,484.9 8,685.3 1,851.0 711.4
9/97 124.6 127.9 166.6 459.9 1,086.2 1,487.9 5,461.1 8,661.7 1,846.9 708.7
8/97 122.8 127.2 166.4 459.6 1,085.2 1,481.5 5,444.5 8,637.2 1,840.9 710.0
7/97 123.0 127.6 166.4 456.3 1,083.2 1,473.4 5,431.4 8,610.7 1,842.3 709.2
6/97 121.3 127.0 165.4 457.8 1,082.5 1,470.6 5,419.1 8,595.4 1,840.8 708.7
5/97 121.4 125.5 164.8 457.0 1,079.5 1,476.9 5,390.3 8,568.5 1,839.0 707.6
4/97 120.2 124.7 163.7 453.6 1,075.9 1,475.4 5,366.6 8,535.2 1,838.9 704.5
3/97 119.1 124.6 162.7 453.9 1,073.0 1,475.6 5,349.4 8,514.6 1,833.1 702.5
2/97 119.4 124.1 162.1 454.4 1,069.5 1,472.0 5,320.9 8,478.9 1,827.4 701.5
* in thousands
** Texas Industrial Production Index
prices have hit a recent dip, as oil prices declined to below
$15 a barrel. When adjusted for inflation, the current price of
oil is lower than the price during the 1986 bust. However, 
energy industry growth remained robust with energy employ-
ment increasing at a 12.8 percent annualized rate in January.
There are reports that prices and wages are beginning to
increase. While overall wages held steady near the end of the
year, some sectors claim substantial increases. The wage in-
creases are beginning to be passed along in modest price 
increases in business services, construction and manufactur-
ing. The strongest inflation has come in office rents and 
the housing price index. However, these increases seem to 
be counterbalanced by stable or decreasing product prices,
especially in imports from Asia.
—John Benedetto
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  7









4 For further evidence on and discussion about the link be-
tween mortgage applications and home sales, see John V.
Duca, “Can Mortgage Applications Help Predict Home
Sales?” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review,
Fourth Quarter 1996, 21–30.
5 These indexes reflect whether and to what degree more 
purchasing managers surveyed experienced rising orders
than falling orders. The indexes are constructed so that
readings below (above) 50 imply that orders are falling 
(rising). For evidence on the link between these indexes and
the real merchandise trade balance, see Goldman Sachs
U.S. Economic Research, “The Pocket Chairman,” January
1998, p. 3.
6 Tax law changes that favor investments in housing include
the new federal law allowing married homeowners to shel-
ter up to $500,000 in residential capital gains every two
years and the recent increase in the Texas homestead ex-
emption (from $5,000 to $15,000).
7 For further discussion, see Lori L. Taylor and Mine K.
Yücel, “The Interest Rate Sensitivity of Texas Industry,” Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review, Second
Quarter 1996, 27–34.
Notes
The authors thank John Benedetto, Sheila Dolmas, Timothy
Hopper, Ricardo Llaudes, Niki Maas, Justin Marion, Keith
Phillips, Marci Rossell and Fiona Sigalla for their assis-
tance with this project.
1 For example, the Wall Street Journal reported that a Korean
company was unable to buy aluminum ingots because a
Singapore bank was not willing to accept its letter of credit
from the state-owned Korea Development Bank. See “Tight
Credit Squeezes Southeast Asian Exporters—Bankers in
Region Reluctant to Lend,” Wall Street Journal, January 23,
1998.
2 Paul Krugman, “What Happened to Asia?” http://web.mit.edu/
krugman/www/DISINTER.html, February 23, 1998.
3 “U.S. December Announced Job Cuts Rose 56% from a
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